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“one-upmanship” (see some of his gracious concessions in the debate with 
Plantinga on religious epistemology: “The Foundations of Theism Again: 
A Rejoinder to Plantinga”), and exhibiting the way in which crisp philo-
sophical thinking can be informed by the history of philosophy and litera-
ture, perhaps best exemplified in Quinn’s riveting treatment of Shusaku 
Endo’s novel silence in his “Tragic Dilemmas, Suffering Love, and Chris-
tian Life.” Surely these essays bear vivid testimony to the fact that the 
philosophical landscape is a richer place because of Philip Quinn.1
1Thanks to T. Allan Hillman, Christian Miller and Ted Poston for comments on drafts of 
this review.
was Jesus God?, by Richard Swinburne. Oxford University Press, 2008. 175 
pp. $24.95 (hardback)
GLENN B. SINISCALCHI, Duquesne University
A little over ten years ago, Pope John Paul II urged philosophers to provide 
bold arguments to establish the preconditions of divine revelation: “Con-
sider, for example, the natural knowledge of God, the possibility of dis-
tinguishing divine Revelation from other phenomena or the recognition 
of its credibility, the capacity of human language to speak in a true and 
meaningful way even of things which transcend all human experience.”1 
Other than being one of the world’s finest Christian philosophers and the 
author of many books and articles on various philosophical topics, Rich-
ard Swinburne has faithfully served the Church with an apologetic vision 
that is clear, courageous, and convincing. His most recent book on the 
subject is no different.
Although was Jesus God? is not as philosophically rigorous as his tril-
ogy on the philosophy of religion, it can be read as a sequel to any of 
his previous publications on natural theology. Because he focuses on the 
reasons to believe in Jesus’s divinity in this volume, he does not provide a 
new battery of arguments for God’s existence which can only show that a 
“bare” or “bland” theism is true. So long as one assumes that God exists, 
the reader will be able to benefit from Swinburne’s newest rationale to be-
lieve in Jesus. “Christian theism,” he rightly points out, “can be true only 
if bare theism is true” (p. 23).
The first prong in the overall argument for Jesus’s divinity consists of 
the pertinent reasons that can be utilized apart from the influence of di-
vine revelation to show that God is the kind of God who would want to 
become a human and do the types of things that Jesus would do. Thus, 
Swinburne’s first goal is to describe and explain the “a priori reasons” for 
expecting God to become incarnate in human history. A priori reasons 
1John Paul II, Fides et ratio, N. 67. 
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arise “from the very nature of God and from the general condition of the 
human race why we should expect them to be true” (p. 5). While it was 
not necessary for God to become human and atone for the sins of human-
ity, there are nevertheless good reasons to think that he would do such a 
thing. It is appropriate for God to identify himself with those who have 
been made in his image (pp. 39–52); it provides reasons for thinking that 
people have intrinsic dignity; and it reveals the extent to which God loves 
the human race. Within this unique state of existence, God will live an 
exemplary human life in terms of teaching the truth about God and being 
supremely moral (pp. 61–77). A divine stamp of approval will be made on 
his life, vindicating his message (pp. 84–87). His teachings will be faith-
fully carried out to future generations in a way that is culturally sensitive 
to each of them (pp. 75–77). Swinburne summarizes his argument in part 
1: “I have argued that, if there is such a God, there are a priori reasons . . . 
for supposing that he has the nature . . . which Christianity claims, and 
that he would act in history to do the things which Christianity claims that 
he has done.” God “would take the nature of a human nature and share 
sufferings, and found a church to tell cultures and generations other than 
those in which he lived on earth about what he had done” (p. 83).
Many apologists are content with arguing for basic Christian faith by giv-
ing philosophical arguments for God’s existence and historical arguments 
for Jesus’s resurrection. Within the second half of this approach, standard 
historiographical principles are used to assess competing hypotheses, all 
of which can account for the few reported facts that have been furnished 
by the consensus of New Testament scholars. After naturalistic hypotheses 
have been tried and found wanting, the resurrection hypothesis is shown 
as the best explanation of the facts. Now there is plenty of merit to this ap-
proach, but Swinburne goes much further than this by spelling out the a 
priori reasons for expecting God to enter human history.
One would be hard-pressed to establish anything about Jesus or his 
resurrection without establishing Swinburne’s a priori reasons for expect-
ing God to make a personal entry into history first. As the prominent New 
Testament historian, Dale Allison, recognizes:
When the mundane historical work is done, the results are disappointingly 
scanty, severely circumscribed. . . . At this point, then, the discussion has to 
be handed over to the philosophers and theologians, among whose lofty 
company I am not privileged to dwell. They, not me, are the ones who can 
address the heart of the matter, the problem of justifying—if such a thing is 
possible—a worldview, the thing that makes the resurrection of Jesus wel-
come or unwelcome, plausible or implausible, important or unimportant.2
According to Allison, a bare theism does not give sufficient leverage for 
the historian to infer on the basis of the evidence that Jesus was raised. In-
deed, in a postmodern age, it is generally assumed that historical conclusions 
2Dale C. Allison, resurrecting Jesus: The earliest Christian Tradition and its interpreters (New 
York: T & T Clark, 2005), 350, 351. 
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are reached through an inextricable interplay of fact and interpretation—
between what is generally accepted and what is intuited. Viable hypoth-
eses are constructed in part and thus vary considerably from historian to 
historian. To be sure, there is no contradiction in proposing an intellectually 
satisfying alternative to the resurrection hypothesis and maintaining that 
bare theism is true. Philosophers should pay attention to Allison’s advice, 
laying out a refurbished case for the Christian faith by taking Swinburne’s 
a priori reasons into serious consideration. The traditional case for Christian 
theism must become more forceful: If God were so cold and detached from 
humanity, it is difficult to conceive why he would have created the universe 
in the first place.
After Swinburne’s a priori reasons have been outlined and explained, 
the discussion turns to what Swinburne dubs the “a posteriori evidence” 
for Christian faith in part 2. The a posteriori evidence is the historical evi-
dence for the life and resurrection of Jesus and the subsequent teaching of 
the Church (p. 23). The teaching of the Church, which consists of Protes-
tant, Catholic, and Orthodox Christianities, counts as indirect evidence for 
Jesus’s divinity. If God is the God of Jesus, it is safe to conclude that he will 
ensure that the Gospel will be heard by subsequent generations after Jesus 
has been glorified. If the central doctrines of the Church are true, then the 
a posteriori evidence should nicely complement the a priori evidence that 
was originally deduced in part 1. Not only will both types of evidence 
harmonize with one another, but the a posteriori evidence for Christianity 
should be able to outstrip all other historical evidence that is brought to 
the table by apologists who are representing other religious traditions.
The New Testament writings provide good evidence for those features 
of a person’s life that would have to be seen if God were to become a hu-
man and do the kinds of things that were established by the a priori evi-
dence. Jesus’s life is the type of life that God would have lived if he were 
to become human. He led a perfect moral life despite the great amount 
of sufferings that he endured (pp. 100–102); he claimed to be God incar-
nate (pp. 102–106); he claimed to make an atonement for humanity (pp. 
106–107); he gave accurate teaching about God’s direction for human life 
(pp. 107–111); and he founded an organized Church that is supposed to 
continue his message (pp. 111–112, 134–143).
After presenting the relevant evidence for Jesus’s life, Swinburne de-
votes an entire chapter to the reality of Jesus’s resurrection (pp. 114–127). 
His greatest contribution to the debate on the resurrection concerns the 
origin and spread of Eucharistic belief and praxis (pp. 119, 120). To my 
knowledge, no contemporary apologist has utilized the evidence of the 
Church’s earliest Eucharistic devotion to argue for Jesus’s resurrection to 
the extent that Swinburne has (Swinburne has used the Eucharist as evi-
dence for the resurrection in a few places in his previous writings). At the 
end of part 2 he concludes that the a posteriori evidence for Jesus’s divinity 
fits in with the a priori reasons better than any other evidence support-
ing other religious claims. Naturally this leads to the conclusion that the 
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doctrines about Jesus’s divinity and the Church’s message about him are 
probably true.
For all of the book’s strengths, there are some notable weaknesses in it. 
In a text that only briefly skims the surface of issues that can literally de-
termine how one evaluates the fundamental truth claims of Christianity, 
Swinburne might have offered some bibliographical resources at the end 
of each chapter (or at the end of the book) for the reader to pursue. Lastly, 
Swinburne does not mention anyone with views that are different from 
or even contrary to his own. In the same vein, it is troubling that he does 
not spend more time elaborating on the challenges that other religious 
scholars pose to the a posteriori evidence for Christian theism (from, say, 
Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, etc.). Thus, a little more negative 
apologetics would have illuminated his overall argument. Undoubtedly 
there will be New Testament scholars who will gainsay the evidence that 
Swinburne marshals in favor of certain components of Jesus’s pre-Easter 
teaching and ministry. Unfortunately, he does not inform the reader of 
the bewildering amount of disagreement that currently exists among New 
Testament specialists in this regard (for example, Dale Allison and Ray-
mond Brown are two reputable scholars who would deny that Jesus pro-
claimed his own deity during his lifetime).
This is not just another apologetics book. John Paul II’s clarion call for 
Christian philosophers and fundamental theologians to defend the faith is 
clearly embodied in was Jesus God? In spite of its minor omissions, those 
who seek to give reasons for Christian faith might well examine Swin-
burne’s newest book. It will give plenty of food for thought.
Moral skepticisms, by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Oxford University Press, 
2006. Pp. xiv + 271. $85.00 (cloth), $19.95 (paper)
E. J. COFFMAN, University of Tennessee
This book argues for two main conclusions: Pyrrhonian Moral skepticism 
(we should suspend judgment on the question of whether any moral be-
liefs are epistemically justified) and Moderate Moral skepticism (moral beliefs 
can be “modestly justified” but not “extremely justified”—more on these 
terms below). Sinnott-Armstrong calls the conjunction of these claims 
Moderate Pyrrhonian Moral skepticism.
The book has two main parts. In Part I, Sinnott-Armstrong’s main 
goals are (a) to identify the best arguments for the conclusion that there 
is no moral knowledge (chapters 2–4) and (b) to develop an argument 
for Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism (chapters 5–6). Chapter 1 helpfully sets 
the stage by distinguishing moral epistemology from other areas within 
moral theory. In Part II, Sinnott-Armstrong builds a case for Moderate 
Moral Skepticism by evaluating four replies to (what he regards as) one of 
